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“Turning out to vote is the most common and important act of political participation in any 
democracy. Voting is also less well understood and explained empirically than other political 
acts engaged in regularly by citizens.”  
John H. Aldrich 
 
The aim of this research is to investigate the relationship between unemployment and voter 
turnout. Many different theories have been proposed to describe how the working condition 
affects the decision to participate at the electoral process, sometimes in contradiction 
between them. The starting point is to understand how economic conditions influence 
political participation.  
The milestone Rosenstone’s research (Rosenstone, 1982) which link voter turnout rates to 
economic indicators propose two potential relationships: the Mobilization and the Withdraw 
effect. In the first case the hypothesis is that economic duress increases political participation 
because under economic strain citizens organize, protest and vote to reverse their economic 
condition. In the second case the opposite occur, economic duress decreases political 
participation because under financial difficulties citizens must deal with more relevant 
constraints withdrawing from political participation. 
Nevertheless, recent studies contest the possibility that the Mobilization and Withdraw 
hypothesis are least too simplistic. Arceneaux (Arceneaux, The Conditional Impact of Blame 
Attribution on the Relationship between Economic Adversity and Turnout, 2003) argues that 
blame attribution has an intervening effect on the relationship between bad economic 
situation and political participation. People who blame the government for the state of the 
economy are more likely to view their economic situation in political terms whereas this link 
may be weak for people who do not draw connection between their economic situation and 
political performances. Moreover, Killian, Schoen, and Dusso (2008) suggest that people are 
motivated to vote when they perceive that their personal financial situation is falling behind 
national trends (Killian, Schoen, & Dusso, 2008) leading to the hypothesis of a non-linear 
relationship between economic indicators and voter turnout. Martins and Veiga (2013) found 
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that the relationship between unemployment rates and turnout is U-shaped. When 
unemployment rates are low, unemployment seems to have Withdraw effect. While when 
unemployment rates are high, unemployment seems to have Mobilization effect. 
Since from the theoretical point of view the question “Does unemployment affects the 
decision to vote? And if yes, in which manner?” has not a unique answer the purpose of this 
analysis in to investigate this relationship from the empirical point of view. The empirical 
analysis is done looking the relationship between unemployment and voter turnout at 
individual level.  
Exploiting Italian National Election Studies (ITANES) repeated cross sectional surveys analysing 
the voting behaviour of Italian citizens in Italian general election from 2001 to 2013 we regress 
self-reported voter turnout on self-reported employment condition. Moreover, 
heterogeneous effects along gender, educational level, social status, geographic conditions 
and past vote behaviour dimensions are explored. 
Our findings support the Withdraw hypothesis in the base model, although the effect is found 
to be very small. While looking at the heterogeneous effects we found that the withdraw from 
electoral participation is counterbalanced by a positive effect along all five dimensions. 
The structure of the analysis is structured as follow. The first chapter is devoted to the 
literature review, reviewing the main features of theorical and empirical previous research. 
The second chapter presents the description of the data and the empirical strategy used for 
the analysis. The third chapter presents the findings and the Oster test. The fourth chapter is 







1.1) Competing theories 
 
Voter turnout is a very popular topic in the academic research field, Ramirez and Sampson 
(2008), find out that “Voter turnout” is the fourth most important topic listed on Google 
Scholar search engine, it become the third ranked among all the topics considering JSTOR 
search engine. 
This quite notable production of scientific research investigates in deep vote participation 
both from theorical and empirical point of view. Different theories are proposed and different 
empirical achievement are shown; sometimes in contradiction between them. 
From the theoretical point of view the traditional model is based on the rational choice 
perspective where the homo-economicus decide whether to vote or not as a result of a cost-
benefit calculation (Downs, 1957). For simplicity the model can be described as follow: two 
alternatives are presented; a voter gets a benefit B > 0 if the alternative he prefers wins the 
election and 0 if the other alternative wins. There is a voting cost C > 0 determined by time 
physically spent in order to go to the polls and some information costs about the two 
alternatives. Then there is the probability that the preferred alternative will win the election 
denominated by P. Thus, the citizen will vote if PB > C (Fowler, 2006) (Aldrich, 1993). 
The pioneer model proposed by Downs in 1957 wanted to highlight the importance of 
including the rational behaviour into the scientific debate of that time where “political 
theorists have often created models without taking into account the economics of political 
action. Consequently, much of the evidence frequently cited to prove that democratic politics 
are dominated by irrational (non-logical) forces in fact demonstrates that citizens respond 
rationally (efficiently) to the exigencies of life in an imperfectly informed world” (Downs, 
1957). 
The main critique adressed to this model is that the impact of a single vote on the election is 
a decreasing function of the size of the population allowed to vote, because in order to have 
an impact on the outcome of the election there must be a situation of exact tie. Then the 
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individual cost - benefit calculation fails to explain turnout when there is large population with 
vote right. Fowler (2006) says that “although the probability that a single vote affects the 
outcome of an election is quite small, the number of people who enjoy the benefit when the 
preferred alternative wins is large. As a result, people who care about benefits to others and 
who think one of the alternatives makes others better off are more likely to vote”. The altruism 
theory of voting suggests that there is an interaction effect between a voter’s consideration 
for others and his awareness that one of the election outcomes will benefit others more than 
the other outcome, and then it extends the traditional calculus of voting model by 
incorporating the welfare of others into an individual turnout decision (Fowler, 2006). 
Moreover, in a laboratory experiment performing the dictator game Fowler (Fowler, 2006) 
finds that the more the individual shares with another anonymous individual, the more likely 
is the individual to vote in real world election.  
Furthermore, the resource model of political participation tries to explain how turnout is 
driven by several key resources such as family income, free time and civic skills 
(communication and organization capacities). The presence or absence of these resources 
contributes substantially to individual participation leading to the assumption that higher 
socioeconomic group, which are better endowed than others, are more likely to vote (Brady, 
Verba, & Schlozman, 1995). These resources not only are distributed nonuniformly among the 
population but in addition they are built, perfected and improved in non-political institutional 
settings of life such us the workplace, social or religious organizations.  
Performing a two-stage least squares analysis (Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995) showed how 
resources of time, money and communication skills are powerful predictors on overall political 
participation in the United States of America. 
Some empirical evidence supports the mobilization voter’s model. This model show that 
people are more likely to attend electoral poll if someone else told them to go to vote. In 
particular, the theory developed by (Arceneaux & Nickerson, Who Is Mobilized to Vote? A Re-
Analysis of 11 Field Experiments, 2009) distinguishes voters and election into two different 
categories: high-propensity or low-propensity voters and then high-silence or low-salience 
elections. High-propensity voters are those who voted regularly in the lasts three previous 
elections and because of their past we assume next round they will go to vote with high 
probability; low-propensity voters are those that since in their past habits did not figure out 
to vote we assume they have less probability to show up at poll next time.  
11 
 
Door-to-door canvassing is most likely to boost turnout among high-propensity voters but not 
low-propensity voters in low-salience elections. Conversely, in high-salience elections, door-
to-door canvassing has little effect on high-propensity voters because they are already 
committed to voting. Instead, it is among low-propensity voters that face-to-face contact can 
be an effective nudge to the polls (Arceneaux & Nickerson, Who Is Mobilized to Vote? A Re-
Analysis of 11 Field Experiments, 2009). 
The milestone Rosenstone’s research “Economic Adversity and Turnout” investigates whether 
the individual economic situation of the potential voter has an impact on his decision to vote 
or not; two competing claims are presented “Mobilization effect” and “Withdraw effect”. 
In the first case the point of the view is that economic duress increases political participation. 
The argument here is that people under economic strain blame the government for their 
situation and vote, organize, lobby, protest and so on to redress their grievances; economic 
adversity increases voter turnout (Schlozman & Verba, 1979). In addition, there is also 
evidence that the motivation to politically punish is greater than the motivation to politically 
reward (Kernell, 1977). 
Looking midterm elections in the USA from 1946 to 1966 Kernell (1997) finds three relevant 
results: first, disapproval of the President’s political conduct is associated to higher level of 
turnout in midterm elections; second, disapproval of the President work is a stronger cause of 
party defection than is approval; and, finally, among nonpartisan voters criticism on the White 
House’s tenant seams to exercise greater impact on voting decision. 
The second perspective makes the opposite claim: people with financial difficulties are less 
likely to vote. The reason is that economic adversity is stressful: it causes a preoccupation with 
personal economic wellbeing, and as a result, the citizen withdraws from such external 
matters as politics. The unemployed, the poor, and the financially troubled are less likely to 
vote. Turnout is lower when short-term unemployment is high, prices are unstable, and a large 
proportion of the population experience financial difficulties. Economic adversity decreases 
voter turnout (Rosenstone, 1982). 
However, this link between personal wellbeing and political orientation may be weak. If 
people with economic problems either do not experience personal duress or do not draw a 
connection between their situation and politics, then economic adversity will not affect the 
likelihood of voting. (Rosenstone, 1982) 
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Some recent research opens the door to the possibility that the withdraw hypothesis is wrong, 
or at least too simplistic. On one hand, Killian, Schoen, and Dusso (2008) suggest that people 
are motivated to vote when they perceive that their personal financial situation is falling 
behind national trends (Killian, Schoen, & Dusso, 2008) and on the other hand, Burden & 
Wichowsky (2014) state that when times are good (unemployment rates are low and one has 
adequate employment) the economy does not provide a strong motivation toward 
participation. The reason is that in times of abundance there is little reason for potential voters 
to believe that turning toward government will do much to make a good situation better. In 
contrast, when economic indicators turn negative the public’s attention is piqued (Burden & 
Wichowsky, 2014). Supporting their statement, they used a large dataset collecting data 
concerning U.S. presidential election from 1976 to 2008 thanks to the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 
Furthermore, blame attribution has an intervening effect on the relationship between 
economic adversity and turnout. People who blame the government for the state of the 
economy are more likely to view their economic situation in political terms and vote. Whereas 
those who do not view the government as responsible for the economy are less likely to vote 
as their financial situation worsens. Economic adversity can lead to either Mobilization effect 
or Withdrawal effect depending on citizens’ attributions of blame for economic conditions 
(Arceneaux, The Conditional Impact of Blame Attribution on the Relationship between 
Economic Adversity and Turnout, 2003). 
The lack of consensus among scholars can be attributable to the possibility of a non-linear 
relationship between economic indicators and voter turnout. Robust empirical evidence is 
found to show that economic conditions affect turnout rates in Portugal’s legislative and 
municipal elections. This empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that the presence and 
magnitude of mobilization or withdrawal effects on turnout depend on economic 
performance. Using five different datasets covering ten electoral periods for legislative 
election and eight electoral periods for municipal election from 1979 to 2005 in Portugal 
Martins and Veiga (2013) found that the relationship between unemployment rates and 
turnout is U-shaped.  
When unemployment rates are low, unemployment seems to have withdraw effects. While 
when unemployment rates are high, unemployment seems to have mobilization effects. 
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Concretely, there is greater turnout in good and bad times, but participation rates are lower 
if the economy is neither too hot nor too cold (Martins & Veiga, 2013). 
The level of industrialization of the state in which the election take place can also play an 
important role in defining the relationship between economic performance and turnout. In 
the industrial world, poor economic performance tends to depress turnout. In the developing 
world, exactly the opposite occurs. Poor economic performance drives more voters to the 
polls. It has been calculated that in the industrialized world real income is directly related to 
turnout while in the developing one there is inverse relationship. In addition to that, turnout 
is less elastic in relation to economic indicators in the former world than in the latter (Radcliff, 
1992). He concludes explaining the reason of this difference by saying that “the difference may 
be attributable to the stakes involved. In the absence of security programs, the potential 
human costs of poor economic performance are much greater. Thus, individuals may be 
considerably more sensitive to changes in the macroeconomy” (Radcliff, 1992). 
 
 
1.2) Determinants of turnout 
 
“Browsing the empirical literature on voter turnout would most likely lead to the conclusion 
that little agreement has been reached about what explains this phenomenon” says Geys in 
his meta-analysis research “Explaining voter turnout: A review of aggregate-level research” 
(Geys, 2006).  
Also looking at the phenomenon from the empirical perspective we realize that there is little 
consensus for what and how affect voter turnout.  This is reflected in the huge number of 
variables brought in relation with turnout rates and in the observation that none of these 
variables is omnipresent (Geys, 2006). Smets and Van Ham (Smets & Van Ham, 2013) reviewed 
90 empirical studies of individual level voter turnout in national elections during the decade 
of 2000 and 2010 and found that of the 176 different independent variables included in the 
90 studies, less than 5 per cent were included in more than 25 per cent of the studies. In this 
section I will present those variables that are considered, statistically speaking, relevant 
affecting voter turnout. 
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Education is considered one of the strongest predictors of voter turnout, the meta-analysis of 
Smet and Van Ham (Smets & Van Ham, 2013) shows that education is positively related to 
individual level turnout as about 70 per cent of the reviewed studies used education as an 
independent variable. However Gallego (Gallego, 2010) underlines that the positive 
relationship does exist in some countries such as the USA, the Czech Republic, and Germany; 
but it is weak in other countries such as Cyprus, Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg, Australia, Spain 
and South Korea. This difference is relevant because it implies that the relationship between 
education and turnout is context dependent. In particular, using data from the Archivio Storico 
delle Elezioni of the Ministry of the Interior of Italy, the Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (ISTAT) 
and the Italian National Election Studies (Itanes), Harka and Rocco (Harka & Rocco, 2019) 
found a sizable negative effect between one year increase in average municipal education and 
voter turnout. 
Population size has a statistically significant negative effect on turnout, that is turnout is lower 
when the population is larger (Geys, 2006). This finding is supported by the theoretical model 
proposed by Downs’ (1957) – previously discussed – where the decision of voting is related to 
a cost-benefit valuation in which the rational voter’s expected benefit increases with the 
probability of affecting the result of the election. The probability of affecting the election 
outcome is influenced by the size of the population. In fact, the larger the size of the 
population, the smaller is the probability that one single vote will influence the result of the 
election  (Oween & Grofman, 1984).  
Following the same theoretical hypothesis, another relevant factor which impact the single 
vote’s probability of affecting the election result is the closeness of the election; where the 
standard measure to calculate closeness is the vote gap between the first and the second 
candidate in the political race. The smaller the gap, the closer the election is considered. The 
closer the election is expected to be, the higher becomes the probability that one vote affects 
the outcome. Then closeness is expected to be positively related with voter turnout (Geys, 
2006). 
An alternative explanation that leads to the same claim is given by Cox and Munger (1989) 
which say that the positive correlation between closeness and voter turnout is partially 
explained by an indirect effect through campaigning expenditures. Using Federal Commission 
data on campaign expenditures for 1982 U.S. House election they found that closeness 
increase campaigning expenditures that in turn increase voter turnout. The reason why this 
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occur is that campaign expenditures are expected to lower the costs of information acquisition 
(Chapman & Palda, 1983) and to stimulate interest in election leading to an increase in 
awareness levels of issues and benefits of electoral participation (Dawson & Zinser, 1976). 
Another socio-economic variable that has been found to be an important determinant of voter 
turnout is population stability. Geys states (Geys, 2006) three reason why higher population 
stability is expected to heighten voter turnout. The first reason is that a “stable population 
increases feeling of identification and group solidarity and thereby “social pressure” towards 
voting “. The second reason is concerned with information costs of voting because living in 
the same area for longer periods of time improves knowledge of local issues and candidates 
lowering information costs. The third reason says that lower population stability may suggests 
higher disinterest in local policy since potential voters might live elsewhere in the near future.  
Population mobility (the percentage of the population that has moved out of or toward a 
certain area), population grow, and homeownership (the percentage of owner-occupiers in 
the community) are the measure used in literature in order to estimate the effect of 
population stability (Geys, 2006). 
The institutional procedures governing the course of the elections strongly affect turnout. 
Whether the electoral system is consisting of majority, plurality or proportional 
representation is generally believed to have an effect on the number of people turning out 
(Geys, 2006). 
Under proportional representation turnout is expected to be higher compared to plurality and 
majority system. It is argued that the large disproportion between votes and seats in majority 
systems instils in many citizens the feeling that their vote is not important and thus 
discourages them from turning out. This is especially true of supporters of weaker parties, 
which are then themselves discouraged from making an effort. The result is fewer parties and 
thus less choice, which, in turn, discourages voters from participating (Ladner & Milner, 1999). 
Furthermore, proportional representation, with its multi-member districts, makes it less likely 
that some districts will be non-competitive, so that parties have more incentive to campaign 
everywhere and voters more incentive to turn out and vote (Blais & Carty, 1990 ). Finally, 
proportional representation increases the number of parties and thereby the variety of 
options among which voters can choose (Blais & Carty, 1990 ). The more parties there are, the 
higher the number of options voters will have, and the more likely it is that voters will find a 
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party to identify with. The result is that more voters will be inclined to vote (Smets & Van Ham, 
2013). 
Compulsory voting, as seems obvious, increases turnout. Theoretically, the positive 
correlation between voter turnout and compulsory voting is explained through the increasing 
expected costs of not voting for the individual due to the possibility of getting caught and fined 
(Geys, 2006). Moreover Jackman (Jackman, 1987) estimates that compulsory voting increases 
turnout by about 13 percentage points. Compulsory voting increases turnout and its impact 
depends on its enforcement. It is not clear how strict that enforcement must be in order to 
work (Blais A. , 2006). 
Several elections organized at the same time is found to positively affect voter turnout (Geys, 
2006). Two main reasons are proposed to explain positive relation between concurrent 
elections and voter turnout: firstly, the cost of attending the ballot is a fixed cost, unrelated 
to the number of elections the voter needs to cast a vote upon then “an added election on 
the ballot spreads the cost of voting” (Carter, 1984). Secondly, more races increase the 
likelihood that media pays attention to at least one of the elections. This should increase the 
general awareness and information level of the electorate (Geys, 2006). 
Investigating the determinant of voter turnout looking at the Italian municipality elections 
during the period from 2002 to 2013 Revelli (Revelli, 2017) find that turnout is systematically 
higher when those elections are held at the same time of elections for other tiers of 
government such us regions, state, and European Parliament. Thanks to a large dataset 
composed by official data from the Ministry of Interior of Italy and ISTAT he could focus on 
more than 6000 municipalities over fifteen Italian regions and he could observe over a decade 
more than 15000 elections. 
The estimation results point out that electoral uncertainty, in terms of the degree to which an 
election is contested and of the win margin of the mayor, is a key determinant of individuals’ 
participation decision. Turnout is increasing in the number of mayor candidates, it is 
decreasing in the win margin of the mayor, and it is significantly lower in uncontested elections 
(Revelli, 2017). Moreover it has been found a negative effect of the size of the electorate on 
turnout rates and a strong influence of age structure on voting behaviour where turnout is 
highest amongst people in their 40s and 50s, and lowest among young and elderly voters 




1.3) UNEMPLOYMENT AT INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
 
As what we have seen so far, studies that analyse the impact of unemployment’s level on 
aggregate participation rates do not find an unique effect, in contrast those studies that 
analyse the impact of an individual’s being unemployed on his or her propensity to vote seem 
more uniform: the unemployed is generally less likely to show up at turnout than the 
employed (Aytaç, Rau, & Stokes, 2020).  
Using European Social Survey data, a biennial cross-national survey of attitudes and behaviour 
that refers to twenty-four European countries, Gallego (Gallego, Unequal Political 
Participation in Europe, 2007) finds that unemployed vote less frequently than workers with 
an unlimited contract. Applying a logistic regression analysis, she predicted the voting rate to 
be 5.5 percent lower for unemployed compared to the employed. 
Aytaç et al. (2020) try to explain the withdraw effect among unemployed shifting from the 
opportunity cost theory to a new point of view based on the social psychology of unemployed: 
“Job loss generates feelings of depression and self-blame, emotions that are not propitious 
for self-efficacy or participation. Thus, we generally observe a withdrawal effect among the 
unemployed”. These emotions are, in turn, mitigate by a counter effect when unemployment 
is widespread and the challengers’ campaigns blame the incumbent government for this 
situation or not mitigate by any counter effect when unemployment rate is not widespread 
and the challengers’ campaigns do not focus attention on it. 
Exploiting data from the Current Population Survey, a joint project of the US Census Bureau 
and the US Bureau of Labor Statistics which collects data on voting and voter registration in 
US elections from 1974 over a forty-year period, Aytaç et al. (2020) estimate twenty probit 
models, each corresponding to an election year from 1974 to 2014, in order to find in eighteen 
of the twenty elections a statistically significant and negative effect of the being unemployed. 
Recent literature focused also on the disruptive potential of unemployment particularly 
among younger workers. Following the theoretical argument that political involvement 
combines civic voluntarism and political socialization, and assuming that workplace is a critical 
site for political socialization and to acquire civic skills being deprived of employment in early 
adulthood can lead to negative effects on political involvement (Emmenegger, Marx, & 
Schraff, 2016). Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel collected between 1984 
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and 2013 by the German Institute for Economic Research, Emmenegger et al. (2016) find 
evidence that among younger labour force there is a highly significant negative effect of being 
unemployed on political interest. Thanks to the Propensity Score Matching approach they can 
estimate for those who have experienced unemployment before 30 year of age a depression 
of political interest of about 0.10 points on a scale from 1 to 4. 
Even if the size of the effect might appear moderate it must be reported that the those who 
have experienced unemployment in early adulthood are associated with lower probability, 
roughly 7 percent, to participate in electoral turnout (Emmenegger, Marx, & Schraff, 2016). 
Another study by Kern et al. (2015) highlights the negative relation between economic 
grievance and political participation in more than twenty European countries. Using data from 
the European Social Survey over a time period from 2002 and 2010 they found that 
unemployed people are significantly less likely to become engaged in political participation 
compared to those that are employed. Specifically they focused on the effect after the Great 
Crisis of 2008 supporting the hypothesis that “There is a negative relation between economic 
crisis and the level of political participation” (Kern, Marien, & Hooghe, 2015). 
Using validated turnout data from seven consecutive elections held in Sweden between 1991 
and 2014 Österman and Lindgren (Österman & Lindgren, 2019) studied how individual 
unemployment relates to voter turnout in high and low unemployment contexts. On one 
hand, they found that, without the interaction between individual and contextual 
unemployment, the unemployed on average is 10 percent less likely to attain voting poll than 
the employed. But on the other hand, this negative relationship between individual 
unemployment and voting weakens as overall contextual unemployment increases. 
In contrast with the Mobilization effect theory, it is argued that “if the composition of the 
unemployed varies over the business cycle this could potentially explain why unemployment 
seems to have larger negative effects on political participation in low unemployment 
contexts” (Österman & Lindgren, 2019).  
In fact, when controlling for dynamic selection of individual characteristics there is no longer 
any sign of a conditioning effect of contextual unemployment on turnout among the 
unemployed. These evidences imply that “the supposedly mobilising effect of high 
unemployment would not be a causal effect but only a matter of that in times of high 
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unemployment, more resourceful individuals with a higher level of turnout become 
unemployed” (Österman & Lindgren, 2019). 
Moreover using cross-sectional data for 44 countries in four different continents including 
Europe, Asia, Africa and South America from 1996 to 2013, Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 
(2019), found that individual-level characteristics and structural factors have a major impact 
on voter’s reaction to economic hardships. Their findings show that periods of economic 
downturns hit different socio-demographic groups asymmetrically. In particular, poorer and 
less educated citizens are affected more heavily by economic crisis. Therefore as a result, 
these socio-demographic groups are most likely to become mobilized during bad economic 
times. 
Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita (2019) report that macroeconomic fluctuations have an 
influence on citizens’ turnout decision but they do not affect everyone symmetrically: “the 
mobilization effect of economic downturns is stronger in countries with low welfare spending 
and less globalized economies”. 
For instance, “the predicted probability that citizens with a low level of education vote 
increases from 80% when the measure of change in unemployment is at its mean to 83% when 
there is a high increase in the level of unemployment” (Carreras & Castañeda-Angarita, 2019) 
but no effect is recorded on the probability of turnout for individuals with high socio-economic 
characteristics. 
 In addition to that the mobilizing effect of macroeconomic downturns on the voter turnout 
of citizens with low socio-economic characteristics is stronger in countries that are less 
exposed to globalization. In countries more exposed to globalization economic downturns do 
not influence electoral participation of citizens with low socio-economic characteristics 
(Carreras & Castañeda-Angarita, 2019). 
Eventually, “citizens with low socio-economic characteristics are more likely to vote when 
economic conditions are adverse if welfare policies are less generous. By contrast, in generous 
welfare states an increase in unemployment has no effect on the likelihood of voting of 
citizens with low socio-economic. [..] An economic downturn does not influence the level of 
participation of high-income and well-educated voters. This is true regardless of contextual 
factors such as the level of globalization and welfare spending.” (Carreras & Castañeda-
Angarita, 2019).  
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Another key factor in the determination of individual decision to go to the poll or not is the 
“consuetude”. Danny and Doyle (2009) state that “turning out to vote at election time may be 
habit forming. Habit occurs when, other things being equal, the decision to vote is depending 
on whether the individual di so in the previous election”. Using longitudinal data from the 
British National Child Development Study (NCDS) they find that 89% of British votes who 
attended general election ballot in 1997 also did it in the previous 1987 and 1979 elections. 
They estimated that participating in one electoral race increases the probability of voting in 
the following election by about 13% (Denny & Doyle, 2009).  
Supporting this evidence Geber, Green and Shachar (2003) (Gerber, Green, & Shachar, 2003) 
conducted a field experiment concerning about 25200 registered voters in the municipality of 
New Haven, Connecticut (USA) finding that, all things being equal, an individual is 47% more 











The main sources of data used in this analysis comes from Italian National Election Studies 
association (ITANES) and the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). ITANES is a research 
group of leading academic scholars in the field of analysis of voting behaviour born in 2007 by 
the founding member Istituto Cattaneo plus Professors and researchers from a vast group of 
Italian Universities. ISTAT is the well-known public research organization which is the main 
producer of official statistics in the service of Italian citizens and policy-makers1. 
ITANES conducted several surveys analysing the voting behaviour of Italian citizens over 
national elections. All surveys are conducted soon after the election day in the form of face-
to-face interviews lasting on average 50 minutes. In this analysis I focused on the electoral 
cycle from 2001 to 2013. Before examining the structure of ITANES surveys, I will briefly 
describe the electoral contest in which the analysis is made. 
The Republic of Italy is a democratic country based on a parliamentary political system. The 
Parliament is composed by two houses, the upper house known as the Senate of Republic and 
the lower house known as the Chamber of Deputies. Both the Senate and the Chamber of 
Deputies are elected every five years in simultaneous general elections. Every Italian citizen 
can exercise his or her right to vote, the only requirement is the minimum voting age defined 
at 18 years old for the Chamber of Deputies and 25 years old for the Senate. The right to vote 
can be exercised only physically by the citizen casting his ballot in the municipality of legal 
residence. 
For the purpose of the analysis the voter turnout will be referred only to the Chamber of 
Deputies elections since is the most participated. 
From 2001 and 2013 two different electoral laws were enforced to rule the electoral process. 
The law called Mattarellum ruled the election of 2001 with a mixed criterion, the 75% of the 
seats were elected with a majority system and the last 25% with a proportional criterion. In 
2006, 2008 and 2013 the law called Porcellum ruled the elections with a proportional voting 
 
1 Description from “https://www.istat.it/en/organisation-and-activity” 
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system and a majority premium; in 2014 the Constitutional Court declared the Porcellum 
against the Constitution and then three years later the electoral law was fully abrogated. Both 
electoral laws incentive political parties to attend the electoral session with large coalition to 
maximise the electoral score.  
 
 
2.1) ITANES surveys 
 
The analysis, in order to work with as similar as possible surveys, is conducted over the 2001, 
2006, 2008 and 2013 ITANES investigations of the Italian national elections. 
All four surveys are conducted soon after the election day, they are designed as repeated 
cross-section and contains similar information on individual’s demographic and socio-
economic characteristics. The structure of the questionnaires is designed as follow: the first 
part includes questions about the current economic situation, political culture and media 
exposure; the second part is related to the behaviour of voting, including question on past e 
present vote; lastly the third part is about socio-demographic characteristics. The second and 
the third part of the questionnaires are mainly considered for the purpose of the analysis. 
 The 2001 survey is conducted on a statistical sample of the Italian population composed by 
about 3200 individuals distributed from 258 different municipalities distributed all over the 
country aged from 18 years old to over 75 years old. Table 1 shows the sample distribution by 
gender and year of age compared with the actual Italian population; we can see that the 
sample distribution is good and representative of the full population. There is a slightly over 
representation of the gender male compared to the female if we consider the overall level but 
within the age categories the matching is quite good. The larger differences between the 
sample and the population are concentrated into the oldest category, the over 75 years old, 





Table 1 - Comparison between population and sample: gender and age. Survey 2001 
 Man Woman 
Population 
(a) 
Survey  Population 
(a) 
Survey   
18-24 5,6 5,5  5,3 4,1  
25-34 9,9 10,3  9,7 10,6  
35-44 8,8 8,7  8,9 9,8  
45-54 7,8 8,5  8,0 8,4  
55-64 6,9 7,9  7,5 7,7  
65-74 5,4 6,5  6,7 6,0  
75+ 3,4 2,9  6,0 3,1  
Tot.  47,9 50,3  52,1 49,7  
(a) Source: Istat  
 
In 2006 similar criteria as in the 2001 it has been used for the generation of the survey 
population but this time the sample is composed by about 2000 interviewed following the 
distribution by age and gender showed in table 2. Here too the oldest category is the less close 
to the actual population but it is not a major concern since it will be not taken into 
consideration.  
 
Table 2 - Comparison between population and sample: gender and age. Survey 2006 
 Man Woman 
Population 
(a) 
Sample   Population 
(a) 
Sample   
18-24 4,6 5,3  4,5 4,8  
25-34 9,0 8,5  8,7 7,7  
35-44 9,8 9,2  9,7 11,2  
45-54 7,9 8,8  8,1 9,4  
55-64 7,0 8,5  7,5 8,6  
65-74 5,8 6,6  6,9 5,6  
75+ 4,0 2,8  6,9 3,3  
Total  48,0 49,7  52,0 50,3  
(a) Source: Istat 
 
For 2008 the phone-interviews were conducted over about 3000 respondents aged from 18 
years old to over 75. Table 3 highlight the very close distribution by age and gender of the 




Table 3 - Comparison between population and sample: gender and age. Survey 2008 







18-24 4,5 5,6 
 
4,3 4,4 
25-34 8,5 6,9  8,3 7,6 
35-44 9,9 8,0  9,7 7,6 
45-54 8,1 8,7  8,2 9,0 
55-64 7,1 8,3  7,5 9,0 
65-74 5,8 7,4  6,8 9,5 
75+ 4,2 3,1  7,2 5,0 
Tot.  48,0 48,0  52,0 52,0 
(a)  Source: Istat  
 
Finally, for what concern the survey of 2013 this time the interviews were conducted with the 
computer assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) method over only 1508 individuals in 172 
different municipalities. The comparison between the sample and the population is the less 
accurate over the four surveys but it is still a good representation of the Italian population. 
Table 4 shows the distribution by gender, age and education of the sample and the Italian 
population. 
 
Table 4 - Comparison between population and sample: gender and age. Survey 2013 
  
Man Woman  
Population 
(a) 
Sample   
Population 
(a) 
Sample   
18-24 4,4 6,3  4,3 4,8  
25-34 7,3 7,5  7,3 6,0  
35-44 9,5 6,7  9,6 8,0  
45-54 9,0 8,5  9,3 10,2  
55-64 7,2 8,5  7,8 10,8  
65+ 10,6 13,0  14,1 10,0  
Tot.  48,0 50,5   52,4 49,8   
(a) Source: Istat  
 
It must be mentioned that if the samples are a faithful representation of the population from 
the demographic point of view on the other hand the reported voter turnout is very high well 
above official data, except for year 2006 which one underestimates the official data. This 
evidence supports the theory that self-reported data might be affected by measurement error 
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and that individuals are inclined to over-report vote participation presumably to please the 
interviewer (Harka & Rocco, 2019). Table 5 shows the self-reported voter turnout and the 
official voter turnout recorded from the Ministry of the Interior of Italy.  
 
Table 5 - Comparison between self-reported voter turnout and official voter turnout 
Year  Self-Reported 
voter turnout1 
 Official  
voter turnout2 
2001 95,43  81,38 
2006 80,30  83,62 
2008 91,50  80,51 
2013 87,32  75,20 
percentages of the population 
Sources: 1 ITANES, 2 Ministry of Interior of Italy 
 
Every survey contains a large amount of information since every questionary is composed by 
over than 200 queries. Despite the large number of questions the response rate is not very 
high. This is the reason why in order to preserve the solidity of the analysis I merged the four 
datasets into one. My final sample is composed by 5016 observations in total of which 1511 
are from the wave of 2001, 1574 from the one of 2006, 1223 from the one of 2008 and 708 
from the last one of 2013. The final sample is characterized by a voter turnout of 88.58% and 
a rate of self-reported unemployment declaration of 10.79%; if, self-reported turnout suffers 
from a substantial over representation of voters, on the other hand, self-reported 
unemployment is in line with the actual unemployment recoded by ISTAT in those years which 
varies from about 8% in 2001 to about 12% in 20132.  
In the next section I will describe the variables used in the analysis. 
 
2.2) variables and controls 
 
The dependent variable is called VoterTurnout, it is a dummy variable which assume values 0 
if the interviewed answered “No, I did not go” to the question “Did you vote in the elections 
 
2 ISTAT - Labour force survey, age class over 15-year-old 
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held the last [13th May]3 ?” and 1 if the answer was “Yes, I did go to vote”. As previously 
highlighted self-reported voter turnout suffers of over representation bias, the distribution of 
voters among age cohorts it is represented in Figure 1. We can see that there is little variation 
between different cohorts, but the turnout rate level is stable. 
 
Figure 1 - Distribution of Voter Turnout by age 
Source: elaboration on ITANES data 
 
The variable of interest is called Unemployment, it is a dummy variable which assumes value 
1 if the individual declared to the unemployed at the time of the interview. Since the objective 
of my study is to investigate the impact of being unemployed on the behaviour of voting and 
the interviews are held very soon after the election days, usually they started the surveys few 
days after and lasted for several weeks, I assumed that those who answered to be unemployed 
at the time of the interview they were in the same condition at the time of the elections. 
 
3 13th May for 2001, 9th and 10th April for 2006, 13th and 14th April for 2008 and 24th and 25th February for 2013 
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As we can see from Figure 2 unemployment is a major issue for younger population. From 18 
to 24 years old the unemployment rate is about 30%, it decreases under 10% only for the 
group aged over 35 years old.  
 
Figure 2 - Distribution of unemployment by age 
 
Source: elaboration on ITANES data 
 
A bunch of controls are taken into account. The criteria of selection of the controls respond to 
the necessity to avoid including variables that are themselves outcomes of the variable of 
interest, or in other words bad controls. The first set of variables wants to control for the 
demographic of the sample, they include a gender variable, female, and a level variable for 
age, eta6. The first control is a dummy variable which assume values 1 if the gender of the 
individual is female. The second control sort by age, classifying six group of age: 18-24, 25-34, 
35-44, 45-54, 55-65 and over 65 year old.  
The second battery of controls tend to measure the social status of the observed individual 
through three aspects: the individual’s level of education, the level of education of the 
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individual’s father and by the social status of the individual’s parent occupation and 
individual’s head of household occupation. 
The level of education is based on the official degree obtained through the accomplishment 
of the study cycle that in Italy goes from the lowest degree called “Licenza media” to the 
highest “Dottore di ricerca”. The variable highedu controls for the higher level of education 
assuming value 1 if she or he has obtained a bachelor or higher degree, it assumes value 0 if 
she or he has obtained a high school or lower diploma. 
The same rationale is used for the creation of fatedu, the variable which controls for the 
father’s level of education. The variable assumes value 1 if the father’s education level of the 
interviewed is a bachelor or higher degree, zero otherwise.  
Through several questions about the type of occupation, the level of the position assumed, 
the kind of sector of occupation, the type of industry, the dimension of the firm, the level of 
salary, the total amount of hours worked of both parents and head of household of the 
individual ITANES builds up a variable called classe which try to measure the social class of the 
interviewed sorting the sample into 5 categories: blue collar, rural petite bourgeoisie, urban 
petite bourgeoisie, white collar middle class and bourgeoisie. From this variable it was made 
bourgeoisie a dummy variable that assume 1 if he or she belongs to the bourgeois social class. 
Then indicator of past vote behaviour is also included. The variable indicates if the individual 
has already voted in the five-year previous4 elections and for which political area he or she did 
vote in that occasion. The political areas are distinguished into far right, right, center, left, far 
left and blank ballot. The Italian political spectrum is very large and populated by numerous 
parties. In every electoral session we can observe the presence of new-born political parties 
which are not small and marginal, but determinant for the subsequent determination of the 
Parliamentary majority equilibrium. In the Annex the list of parties and their political location 
is presented. 
To control for the rural dimension of the municipalities where he or she is resident a dummy 
variable called smalltown is created. The variable assumes value 1 if the resident population 
of the town is smaller than 50000 habitants, it assumes 0 otherwise. 
 
4 In 2008 political crisis leads to anticipated general elections 
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Finally regional controls5, indicating the region of residence, and year dummy controls are also 
considered. We admitted for interaction between years and regions creating a set of time-
region dummies for each electoral wave from 2001 to 2013 in order to allow for temporal 
effects to vary at regional level. 
 
 
2.3) Empirical strategy  
 
As seen in the previous chapter the relationship between unemployment and voter turnout is 
not uniformly defined, depending on whether when or where we focus the attention of the 
investigation, we can find divergent evidence. The purpose of this analysis is to understand 
how the relationship between unemployment and voter turnout works in the Italian contest 
looking deeper what happen at individual level, trying to understand how the circumstance of 
being unemployed during the electoral process impact the individual’s decision to vote. 
In order to reach this goal, I define a linear probability model defined as follow: 
 
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽 𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝑖𝑡   (1) 
 
Where 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual 𝑖 declares of having 
voted for the Chamber elections at time 𝑡 and 0 otherwise. The treatment variable 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 is a dummy variable which that indicates if individual 𝑖 is unemployed at the 
time of the electoral run, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the matrix of individual specific controls which includes: 
•  Female  
• Eta6 
• Highedu 
• Fatedu  
• Bourgeoisie   
• Pastvote  
 




Finally, regional dummies, years dummies and year-regional dummies are also added in the 
set of controls; 𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
Year-regional dummies plays a relevant role in this analysis mainly for three reasons. First, 
they account for the change in electoral rules that took place in 2005 with the approval of the 
so-called “Porcellum” electoral law which. Second, they account for the effect of the Great 
Recession of 2007 that hits severely Italy few years later, producing greater downturns in the 
industrial areas which are concentrated in the northern regions of the country. Third, they 
account for the great regional diversity of the Italian country from social, demographic and 
economic point of view. 
Two more restrictions are made on the sample population, the first one is to consider only the 
working age population that goes from 18 years old to 67 and, the second one, is to keep out 
the economically inactive population. With this set up the treatment is given only to the active 
population of the sample in working age times. 
The parameter of interest is 𝛼1 which indicates the effect of unemployment on voter turnout, 
the estimation of the linear probability model is made through an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression. 
Before showing the results, it must be said that in general regressions do not identify causal 
relationship, they do only if the Conditional Independence Assumption holds. 
The causal relationship is given only when the treatment variable is independent of the 
potential outcomes of the dependent variable; in other words when the treatment variable is 
randomly assigned. The Conditional Independence Assumption, also called selection on 
observables, states that the treatment variable is independent of potential outcomes of the 
dependent variable when it is conditional on observed characteristics (Angrist & Pischke, 
2009). Unfortunately the CIA does not provide the indication of which and how many controls 
do you need to make the assumption holds. In this analysis the selection on observed 
characteristics is restricted to those that are actually recorded in the questionnaires of 
ITANES’s surveys, we had to rely on them. We are aware that the CIA assumption is a very 
strong assumption in this set up. 
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The possibility to face omitted variable bias must be considered, in order to deal with this 
problem several strategies are adopted. First, the unorthodox but common approach is to 
examine the sensitivity in changes of the treatment coefficient to the addition of observed 
controls. We can consider the coefficient stability as a sign that omitted variable bias is limited 
(Oster, 2019). Furthermore, a comparison with the parameter of interest estimated by the 
Propensity Score Matching technique will be presented. Finally, the more rigorous Oster Test 
will be performed. 
 
 
2.4) Propensity Score Matching  
 
Further analysis of the estimation of the parameter of interest is made applying the Propensity 
Score Matching technique.  
The Propensity Score Theorem says that “if potential outcomes are independent of treatment 
status conditional on a multivariate covariate vector 𝑋𝑖, then potential outcomes are 
independent of treatment status conditional on a scalar function of covariates, the propensity 
score, defined as:  𝑝(𝑋𝑖) ≡  𝐸[𝐷𝑖|𝑋𝑖] =  𝑃[𝐷𝑖 =  1|𝑋𝑖] ”, where D is binary, formally (Angrist 
& Pischke, 2009): 
 
{𝑦0𝑖, 𝑦1𝑖} ⊥  𝐷𝑖|𝑋𝑖     then   {𝑦0𝑖, 𝑦1𝑖} ⊥ 𝐷𝑖|𝑝(𝑋𝑖)   (2) 
 
In other words, the propensity score theorem says that you need only to control for the 
probability of being treated is enough to guarantee conditional independence of the 
treatment. Then variables that explain the outcomes but not the likelihood of being treated 
can be excluded. 
Moreover, Angrist and Hahn (Angrist & Hahn, 2004) explain that even though there is no 
asymptotic efficiency benefit from the implementation of estimators based on the propensity 
score theorem, there will be a gain in precision in finite samples. 
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In this analysis the estimation of the propensity score is done through a logit model because 
empirical literature proposes that logit model for the propensity score with low degree 
polynomials of continuous variables works well in practice (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). 
Following these indications, the battery of controls used in this specification is slightly 
different from the OLS regression, the variable which accounts for the behaviour of five-years 
before vote is not included since it appears to not directly affect the likelihood of being 
unemployed five-years later. The following controls are instead included: Female, Eta6, 








In this chapter the results of the analysis are presented, we are going to explore first the OLS 
regression, then the Propensity Score Matching estimate and at last the robustness check 
Oster test. 
Table 6 shows the results for the baseline model estimated through the OLS regression 
following four different specifications. It is interesting to see the trend of the coefficients 
through the different specifications. In particular, in the first column only two controls are 
considered those that accounts for time e regional effects. The coefficient of unemployment 
is negative and statistically significant. 
In column 2 the demographics controls referring to gender and age are added. Surprising the 
coefficient of Female is very small and not statistically significant, it will be not significant that 
for all the specifications. 
In column 3 controls for high education level and social class are added, Unemployment 
remains negative and statistically significant at 1% but this time we can notice that the two 
statistically significant controls Highedu and Burgesoise are of the same magnitude but 
opposite in sign, +0.032 the former and -0.031 the latter. This evidence leaves the door open 
to the hypothesis that among the higher social classes of the country the very elite tend to 
withdraw from electoral participation. 
In column 4 controls Pastvote and Smalltown are also considered. In this specification almost 
all controls are statistically significant with the exception of Female and Fatheredu. 
Unemployment is reduced in significance at 5% and slight decreased its effect to -0.032. 
Smalltown is small and positive suggesting that living in a small municipality contribute to 
increase the probability of voting which is in line with previous literature. Pastvote results to 
be in every level positive and statistically significant at 1%. We can interpret the positive 
coefficients of Pastvote saying that having previously voted at least one time, no matter for 





Table 6 - Treatment Effect on Voter Turnout 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 



















































































































































     
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Time – Regional 
Dummies 
No No No No 









Observations 5016 5016 5016 5016 
R2 0.049 0.050 0.052 0.099 
Standard errors in parentheses.  




Table 7 shows the specification of the model with all the controls taken into consideration. 
We can see that the value of the coefficient of Unemployment is -0.033, it is still negative and 
statistically significant at 5% proving that the status of being unemployed negatively affects 
the desire of voting. Looking at the trend given by the five specifications we can notice that 
the effect of unemployment, which goes from the highest value of -0.051 to the lowest -0.033, 
does not vary much across the different specifications but reduces its magnitude. 
The coefficients of Female and Fatedu are close to zero but not statistically significant, by 
contrast almost all other controls are significant at 1%. It is interesting to notice that all the 
coefficients for different group of age are negative and highly significant. This indicates that 
with respect to the youngest cohort older individuals tend to vote less. Highedu is still positive 
but the statistical significance drops to 10%, in contrast Bourgeoisie holds its level of 
significance and increased to -0.035 which indicates that the highest social class tend to 
withdraw from the electoral competition. It is confirmed that living in a municipality with less 
than 50000 habitants gives a positive stimulus to the voter participation since the coefficient 
of Smalltown is positive and statistically significant at 5%.  
Finally past vote behaviour has an important role affecting current turnout since all the 
coefficients result to be high statistically significant, positive and lager in magnitude with 
respect to other controls, with the exception for the case of blank ballot which is close to zero 
and not significant. This evidence suggests us that it is not important for what political party 
the individual voted in last election, the acting of voting itself is enough to generate a stimulus 





Table 7 - Treatment Effect on Voter Turnout 
  





Eta 25-34 -0.0897*** 
(0.0200) 
Eta 35-44 -0.0729*** 
(0.0201) 
Eta 45-54 -0.0894*** 
(0.0203) 
Eta 55-64 -0.0756*** 
(0.0225) 






Bourgeoisie  -0.0351** 
(0.0152) 
Pastvote=Far Right 0.263*** 
(0.0217) 
Pastvote=Right  0.247*** 
(0.0192) 
Pastvote=Center  0.294*** 
(0.0279) 
Pastvote=Left  0.265*** 
(0.0188) 











Year Dummies Yes 
 
Regional Dummies Yes 
 







Standard errors in parentheses. 




Furthermore, the estimation of the parameter of interest Unemployment, is made applying 
the Propensity Score Matching technique. The specification includes the following controls: 
Female, Eta6, Highedu, Fatedu, Bourgeoise, Smalltown, Year Dummies and Regional Dummies. 
The result showed in table 8 indicates that to be unemployed has negative impact on the 
decision to go to vote. The individual, all being equal, who is unemployed has about 4% less 




Table 8 - Propensity Score Matching estimation 
  









Robust standard errors in parentheses 






3.2) Oster Test 
 
In the previous section I mentioned the possibility for this analysis to have to deal with omitted 
variable bias. The omitted variable bias occurs when variables correlated either with the 
outcome variable and the explicative variable are not included in the regression, it can happen 
for several reason such as the lack of observed data availability or because the effect on the 
outcome variable is unknown. 
Despite in some cases it is possible to assert that one or a set of controls fully capture a specific 
omitted variable, in many other cases observed controls do not fully capture the true omitted 
variable effect leading to biased results (Oster, 2019). In order to check if my results are 
affected by omitted variable bias even after adding the full set of controls, I performed the 
Oster test. 
The Oster test developed by Oster (2019), under the assumption that a share of variance of 
the dependent variable is both influenced by the observed and the unobserved controls which 
are correlated with it, evaluates the value of the coefficient of interest if the unobserved 
controls would have been added to the regression. In particular, the test exploits the 
relationship between the omitted variables bias and the changes in R-squared determined by 
the introduction of the observable variables. Furthermore, to compute the Oster test two 
more assumption must be established: the relative degree of selection on observed and 
unobserved variables, denoted as 𝛿, and the value for 𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥.  
Oster herself to allows other researchers to perform a consistent estimate of the bias-
adjustment treatment effect suggest to set 𝛿 = 1, indicating that the unobservable are as 
important as the observable controls, and 𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1,3 ∗  ?̃? where ?̃? is the R-squared from the 
regression computed with the observed controls (Oster, 2019). 
 
Table 9 – Oster test 
Coefficient of interest OLS Oster 




In table 9 are reported both estimates of the treatment variable’s coefficient Unemployment 
under OLS regression with full set of controls taken into account and the Oster test with the 
specification explained above. We can notice that the Oster estimation slightly reduce the 
magnitude of the coefficient but both estimations show a negative and small size effect.  
This result confirms that the presence of omitted variable bias nevertheless we can suppose 








The aim of this research is to investigate the relationship between the working status of an 
individual and his or her propensity to vote, the results presented in the previous chapter give 
us a clear indication on the negative nature of this relationship. The unemployed tend to vote 
less compared to the employed. Although, what happen when we look deeper into the 
unemployment category, what are the relationships within the unemployed category? 
Within the unemployed category many heterogeneous situations can be found, especially in 
a country such as Italy characterized by high degree of diversity from geographic, economic 
and social point of view. It is worthfully to highlight that Italy records very low women’s 
employment rates. From 2001 to 2013 the women’s employment rates balanced from 19,2% 
to 15,6%6 which is about 2.5 times lower the men’s employment rates for the same period. 
Looking at the distribution of wealth, the Italian situation is marked by high degree of wealth 
concentration into limited groups of privileged people. Moreover, from the geographic point 
of view Italy is characterized by strong regional peculiarities and large number of small and 
medium sized municipalities in which the majority of the national population is settled.   
In this chapter we are going to explore how gender, educational level, social status, geographic 
conditions and past vote behaviour interacting with the working status of the individual can 
affect the voting decision. In order to better understand how these characteristics can affect 
the turnout decision among unemployed I extend the model (1) by including, in turns, five 
interaction terms, one for each characteristic.  
Table 10 shows the heterogenous effect of gender on voting decision while being unemployed 
is a female. It is interesting to notice that the effect of being unemployed and female is 
positive, strongly statistically significant and size of about 0.07 which it fully contrasts and 
overcomes the negative effect of being unemployed. 
From the geographic perspective we found that living in a small municipality is a good 
incentive to go to vote, moreover Table 11 highlight that living in a municipality with less than 
 
6 ISTAT - Labour force survey 
43 
 
50000 habitants is even larger incentive to go to vote when the individual is unemployed. The 
coefficient of the interaction term is funded to be positive and about 0.052 which almost 
neutralize the effect of being unemployed. 
From the social perspective heterogeneous effect were investigates through the educational 
level and the social class. When high educated citizen is unemployed the effect of his working 
condition has a positive incentive to participate at electoral game, once again the 
unemployment effect is fully neutralized and overcome by the interaction term which leads 
to a positive incentive to vote, although the coefficient is founded not statistically significant 
in our sample (Table 12). Moreover, when the social class is take into consideration we 
observe change in sign too. The coefficient of being bourgeois and unemployed is positive, of 
large size, neutralize and overcome the unemployment effect but it is not statistically 
significant (Table 13).  
Looking deeply how past vote behaviour influence current electoral behaviour we explored 
heterogeneous effect of being without work on the experience of past vote. Although none of 
the coefficients is found significant, we can notice that when the unemployed individual voted 
for the far left or center parties the effect is large and negative producing the overall effect of 
-0.13 for the former and of -0.11 the latter, as shown in Table 14. When the past vote was 
given to other parties the effect is positive but small or very small. 
Since these two political areas have always been determinant in the stability or instability of 
the political system in the Italian Parliament producing falls and changes in Government 
alliances it can be speculated that an individual who is facing unemployment and voted for a 
party which caused political instability is more disenchanted toward politics and withdraw 





Table 10 - Heterogeneous Effect on Voter Turnout 
   
  
















   
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes 






Observations 5016 5016 
R2 0.122 0.123 
Note: the dependent variable is voter turnout; female is a dummy variable which 
takes 1 for gender.  In column (1) the base model is presented, in column (2) the 
interaction term between unemployment and female is included. In both 
specification other controls are: class of age, level of education, level of father’s 
education, social class, past vote behaviour and municipality dimension. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 








Table 11 Heterogeneous Effect on Voter Turnout 
  
  


















   
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes 





Observations 5016 5016 
R2 0.122 0.122 
Note: the dependent variable is voter turnout; highedu is a dummy variable which 
takes 1 for level of education greater than bachelor degree.  In column (1) the 
base model is presented, in column (2) the interaction term between 
unemployment and level of education is included. In both specification other 
controls are: gender, class of age, level of father’s education, social class, past 
vote behaviour and municipality dimension. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 






 Table 12 - Heterogeneous Effect on Voter Turnout 
 
 


















   
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes 





Observations 5016 5016 
R2 0.122 0.122 
Note: the dependent variable is voter turnout; bourgeoisie is a dummy variable 
which takes 1 for high social class.  In column (1) the base model is presented, in 
column (2) the interaction term between unemployment and bourgeoisie is 
included. In both specification other controls are: gender, class of age, level of 
education, level of father’s education, past vote behaviour and municipality 
dimension. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 








 Table 13 - Heterogeneous Effect on Voter Turnout 
 
 



















Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes 





Observations 5016 5016 
R2 0.122 0.122 
Note: the dependent variable is voter turnout; smalltown is a dummy variable 
which takes 1 for municipality dimension.  In column (1) the base model is 
presented, in column (2) the interaction term between unemployment and 
municipality dimension is included. In both specification other controls are: 
gender, class of age, level of education, level of father’s education, social class 
and past vote behaviour. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 







 Table 14 - Heterogeneous Effect on Voter Turnout  
   
  













































Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes 






Observations 5016 5016 
R2 0.122 0.122 
Note: the dependent variable is voter turnout; pastvote is a variable which indicates past vote 
behaviour.  In column (1) the base model is presented, in column (2) the interaction term 
between unemployment and past vote behaviour is included. In both specification other 
controls are: gender, class of age, level of education, level of father’s education, social class 
and municipality dimension. 







The aim of this analysis was to better understand the relationship between unemployment 
and voter turnout. Looking into the contest of Italian general election from 2001 to 2013 our 
findings support the Withdraw hypothesis formulated by Rosenstone (1982). Our results are 
in line with the empirical economic literature focused on the individual level voting decision 
which finds that the unemployed is generally less likely to show up at turnout than the 
employed. For European countries the voting rate is predicted to be 5.5 percent lower for 
unemployed compared to the employed (Gallego, Unequal Political Participation in Europe, 
2007). 
The estimates given by the OLS regression confirm the negative effect of being unemployed 
on the voting behaviour, every specification of the model shows small but sizable negative 
effect varying from about -0.05 to -0.03. The Propensity Score Matching technique attest the 
estimation of the unemployment effect at -0.04. 
Although we can consider the coefficient stability as a sign of limited omitted variable bias, we 
accounted for the possibility to face omitted variable bias. Thus, we performed the Oster test, 
which account for the presence of unobserved characteristics. The result of the Oster test 
validated the presence of a negative but small bias. 
Looking deeper into the complexity of unemployment relationships along five different 
dimensions gender, educational level, social status, geographic conditions and past vote 
behaviour we found heterogeneous effect that counterbalance the negative impact of the 
working status, although most of the results were found not statistically significant. 
In particular being unemployed and female is found not only statistically significant at 1% but 
to have a positive effect on voter turnout which fully overcome the unemployed standalone 
effect. Moreover, living in a municipality with less than 50000 habitants is found statistically 
significant and almost neutralize the negative effect of being unemployed on voter turnout. 
In 1993 John H. Aldrich said that “turning out to vote is the most common and important act 
of political participation in any democracy. Voting is also less well understood and explained 
50 
 
empirically than other political acts engaged in regularly by citizens”. Since then some 
knowledge and empirical explanation has been given by scientific research but full 
understanding of the phenomenon is not achieved yet. With this analysis a tried to add my 
little contribution to the arduous task. 
Without any doubt turning out to vote is still the most common and important act of political 
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List of parties - Chamber of Deputies national election 
Note: Far right (FR), Right (R), Center (C), Left (L), Far Left (FL) 
 
1996 election 
Alleanza nazionale ...................................... FR 
Ccd-Cdu ....................................................... C 
Forza Italia  ................................................. R 
Lega Nord .................................................... R 
Lista Dini-Rinnovamento italiano ............... C 
Lista Pannella / Sgarbi................................. C 
Lista Socialista ............................................. L 
Movimento Sociale Fiamma-Tricolore ....... FR 
Pds - Partito democratico della sinistra ...... L 
Popolari  ...................................................... C 
Rifondazione comunista ............................. FR 
Verdi ........................................................... L 
 
2001 election 
Alleanza Nazionale ......................................  FR 
Ccd-Cdu (Biancofiore) .................................  C 
Comunisti italiani ........................................  FL 
Democratici di Sinistra ................................  L 
Democrazia europea - D’Antoni  ................  C 
Fiamma tricolore ........................................  FR 
Forza Italia ..................................................  R 
Il Girasole (I Verdi – Sdi) .............................  L 
La Margherita -Democrazia è Libertà con Rutelli L 
Lega Nord ....................................................  R 
Lista Bonino/Radicali ..................................  C 
Lista Di Pietro - Italia dei valori ...................  L 
Rifondazione Comunista .............................  FR 
 
2006 election 
Rifondazione Comunista  ............................ FL 
Partito dei Comunisti Italiani  ..................... FL 
Verdi  ........................................................... L 
L’Ulivo, composto da DS e Margherita  ...... L 
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Rosa nel Pugno - Socialisti Democratici e Radicali  L 
Italia dei Valori (Lista di Pietro)  .................. L 
UDEUR (Mastella)  ....................................... C 
UDC (Casini)  ................................................ C 
Forza Italia  .................................................. R 
Alleanza Nazionale  ..................................... FR 
Nuova DC + Psi di De Michelis  .................... C 
Lega Nord  ................................................... R 
Alternativa Sociale (Alessandra Mussolini)  FR 
Repubblicani (La Malfa)  ............................. C 
Partito dei Pensionati  ................................. C 
 
2008 election 
Sinistra Arcobaleno (Bertinotti)  ................. FL 
Partito Democratico (Veltroni) ................... L 
Italia dei Valori (Di Pietro)  .......................... L 
Popolo delle Libertà (Berlusconi)  ............... R 
Lega Nord (Bossi) ........................................ R 
Unione di Centro (Casini)  ........................... C 
La Destra (Santanchè/Storace)  .................. FR 
Partito Socialista (Boselli)  ........................... C 
Movimento Per l'Autonomia (Lombardo) ... RF 
